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1.  Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to outline an approach to communication and pragmatics 
which under the names of "Activity based Communication Analysis" or 
"Communicative Activity Analysis" has been under development since the mid 70´s (cf. 
Allwood, 1976).  To do this I start by giving a critical review of some of the main 
theoretical contributions in relation to which the approach has been articulated as a 
response. I then go on to present some of the main ideas and concepts while giving 
references to papers in which a more detailed argumentation can be found. 
 
2.  Background 
The background for the approach is interdisciplinary, covering philosophy (e.g. Peirce 
1940, Wittgenstein 1953, Austin 1962 and Grice 1975), linguistics (e.g. Firth 1957), 
anthropology (e.g. Malinowski 1922), psychology (e.g. Bühler 1934, Vygotsky 1978, 
Rommetveit 1974), and sociology (e.g. Mead 1934, Goffman 1974, Garfinkel 1967 and 
Sacks, Schegloff  and Jefferson 1974). 
I do not claim that the ideas presented below are necessarily always unique. There 
have also been other approaches which, even if not always explicitly concerned with 
pragmatics, show an affinity with the ideas presented below, see, for example, Hymes 
1971, Levinson 1979 and Goldkühl 1982. This is reassuring, since it indicates that 
perhaps something of what is really going on in language and communication is 
contained in the ideas presented below. 
I will, however, not attempt to treat this background in detail. Rather I will place 
my approach in relation to some of the contributions mentioned above through a 
combination of a critical discussion and an attempt to briefly indicate what conclusions I 
want to draw. In the sections following this, I will then slightly expand on these 
conclusions. 
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2.1  Wittgenstein 
In the philosophical investigations (1953), Ludwig Wittgenstein formulated many deep 
and provoking ideas concerning our conception of language and thought.  Of relevance 
here are perhaps primarily his ideas about meaning.  Wittgenstein claims that meaning is 
determined by use and that use is determined by language games which together make 
up a form of life.  He, thus, explicitly acknowledges the role of a community and of 
interaction for the analysis of meaning and language and his approach is therefore not as 
individualistic and atomistic as that of, for instance, speech act theory (see section 2.2).  
The problem, however, is that Wittgenstein’s text, although inspiring, is vague and 
suggestive rather than precise and specific. 
Activity based communication analysis is an attempt to build on Wittgenstein’s 
insights by making some of his concepts more precise and specific.  The idea that 
"meaning is determined by use" is retained and analyzed as: meaning is determined by 
use in three types of context: 
(i) perceptual context,  
(ii) social activity and  
(iii) activated background information.  
The idea of a "language game" is analyzed as stereotypical language use in a particular 
type of social activity (see section 5 and Allwood 1989) and the idea of a "form of life" 
is analyzed as culture.  The introduced three concepts of context: perceptual context, 
social activity and activated background information, as well as culture, are then given a 
further analysis.  
It is clear that many of the nuances of Wittgenstein’s analysis are lost in this 
analysis and that new elements have been added. But the result is hopefully still 
interesting and characterized by somewhat more precision and specificity than 
Wittgenstein’s original remarks. 
2.2  Speech Act Theory 
The second contribution I will consider is Speech Act Theory as formulated in Austin 
1962 and Searle 1969.  This approach was very important in pointing to the idea that 
speaking (but by implication also writing and communicating in general) should be 
regarded as a species of social action.  The fruitfulness of the approach is attested to by 
its influence in other disciplines like sociology (Habermas 1984), AI (Perrault 1980 and 
Cohen 1986), and linguistics (Leech 1983). 
However, speech act theory which in its original formulation, after considering the 
role of “performatives”, becomes based on the idea that a speech act can be seen as 
constituted by a combination of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts or 
forces has some conceptual difficulties.  Among these are the following (cf. also 
Allwood 1977): 
(i) Speech acts are supposed to be conventional. At least, this is so for the so called 
locutionary an illocutionary aspects of a speech act. But is this really a generally 
tenable assumption when it comes to illocutionary acts?  A can warn B without 
carrying out the warning in a conventional manner.  What counts is either his 
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intention to get B in a state of alarm with regard to some danger or the successful 
achievement of this effect.  Whether the warning is carried out conventionally or 
not, seems irrelevant.  To the extent that conventions are involved, they are 
primarily lexical (there is a word "warning" with a certain meaning) and 
grammatical (there is a declarative mood which I can use to state "I warn you"). 
(ii) In fact, it is questionable whether there is any need at all for the concepts 
"illocutionary and perlocutionary act".  They seem to be reducible to the concepts 
"intention", "behavior" (with certain form and content), "result" and "context" 
which are needed anyway for a general of theory of action, of which speech act 
theory would be a special case. See Grice 1957 and Allwood 1976 and 1978. 
(iii) A third problem concerns the assumption often made in speech act theory that an 
utterance normally has only one illocutionary force (is only one speech act).  As 
soon as we start examining transcriptions of real dialog, we notice that utterances 
are both sequentially and simultaneously multifunctional.  Just like in the general 
theory of action, this suggests that "speech acts", like actions in general, should be 
regarded as intentionally and contextually determined functional aspects of the 
underlying behavior (which in the case of talk, we can identify with utterances), 
rather than independent behavioral units. 
(iv) Another problem with speech act theory is its lack of treatment of "contextuality".  
It does not deal with how the action status of an utterance to a large extent is 
dependent on its contextual relations.  The sentence “no it doesn't” becomes an act 
of agreement if uttered after a negative statement like “it isn't raining” but an act of 
disagreement if uttered after a positive statement like “it is raining”. 
(v) A fifth problem which is related to the problem of contextuality is the "atomism" 
or "individualism" of "speech act theory". Speech act analysis primarily concerns 
acontextual utterances by individual speakers in monologue, rather than 
contextualized utterances uttered by interacting speakers pursuing a joint activity. 
(vi) A sixth problem which has been backgrounded in speech act theory is cultural 
relativity. Normally, speech act theory has been concerned with English. However, 
it is not difficult to show that the correspondence between English speech act 
terms and the speech act terms in other languages is not one-to-one and that this 
lack of correspondence is either due to the non-existence of direct correspondents 
or to very different polysemy patterns and conditions of idealization (e.g., ideas of 
what an ideal promise is). In spite of this, there  has often been a tacit assumption 
of universality for the analyses presented and cultural and linguistic differences 
have not been the subject of much study. 
The mentioned problems (and some others) have led me (Allwood 1976, 1978) to an 
alternative analysis of what I take to be the essential insight behind speech act theory - 
the idea that communication is action.  In this alternative analysis, action is seen as 
constituted by a combination of intention, behavioral form, result and context.  In ideal 
circumstances all four factors are present, but for attribution of speech act labels one of 
them is often sufficient.  The communicative intentionality mainly involved in 
communicative acts is claimed to be of two kinds:  (i) expressive and (ii) evocative, 
both of which are normally co-present (see also section 7.1). For example, a statement is 
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in a stereotypical case used both to express beliefs and to evoke beliefs in an 
interlocutor, where, in this case and many others, the expressive intention is a 
precondition of the evocative intention, i.e. the fact that speaker A expresses a belief is, 
normally,  by the listener B taken as a reason to believe that A has good grounds for his 
belief which, in turn, is good grounds for B to share the belief. 
A communicative act is successful if it is perceived, understood and evaluated by 
the listener and it is maximally successful, for the speaker, if all its evocative intentions 
meet with success, i.e., in the case of a statement that the interlocutor not only 
perceives, understands and evaluates but also is able and willing to believe the claim 
made.  This, in turn, entails an account of understanding and evaluation which is 
commented on briefly below (see section 7.3). 
2.3  Conversation Analysis 
Another contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of language use has been 
made by "conversation analysis".  See, for example, Sacks 1992 and Schegloff 1986. 
This approach has been very important in underlining the need for real empirical studies 
( in the case of “conversation analysis”,  often limited to audio tape) of conversational 
interaction. The practice in many other approaches of relying only on illustrative, often 
invented, examples may lead to neglect of complexity and of phenomena not covered by 
one’s theory. Conversational analysis has also been important in pointing to the fact that 
certain conversational phenomena only arise through interaction and can never be found 
if attention is limited to individual contributions. 
However, also conversational analysis has certain conceptual problems which I 
will now briefly discuss. 
(i) The concept of "turn" as originally put forth in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 
1974 can be said to be a combination of the notions of "utterance", "sentence" and 
"speech act" with the notions of "right to speak", "holding the floor" and "having 
an audience".  In some cases, these notions coincide, in others they don't, which, 
for example, leads to difficulties in deciding whether a given contribution is a turn 
or not.  Rather than leaving the interpretation of what a turn is open in this way, it 
would be preferable to connect speaker contributions analytically with a bundle of 
features constituted by the above mentioned concepts and admit that all of them do 
not always coincide (see section 6.1). This suggestion would, however, also have 
the consequence that turns would be a derived rather than basic concept of 
conversational organisation which probably means that the suggestion would be 
rejected by followers of "conversation analysis". 
(ii) Conversation analysis prefers not to explicitly invoke intentional features as  
explanations. This has among other things lead to a positing of "adjacency pairs" 
(i.e., common sequences of contributions with certain communicative functions) 
as a social phenomenon.  No theory exists over and above the idea that some pairs 
are preferred over others (i.e. given a particular "first pair part" a particular 
"second pair part" is preferred). What is needed is, however, a theory which 
explains the nature of the link between the members of an adjacency pair. This 
should, in turn, lead to an explanation of why different links might have different 
 6 
strengths and to an attempt to find descriptive data which could shed light on how 
frequent different links are in different settings. 
(iii) More generally, one might say that "conversation analysts" uphold a kind of 
ideology of "interpretation free observation" which makes them believe that 
everything that influences conversation should be visible in the transcriptions and 
should not require extra background knowledge from the analyst.  My impression 
is, however, that while this ideology has some positive consequences in that it 
leads to closer attention to details of what is observable, it also has clear negative 
consequences in that it leads to implicit rather than explicit use of background 
information and to interpretation with attribution of intentional features without 
acknowledging them as such. 
(iv) The emphasis on overtly visible "accountable practices" also leads to an (over) 
emphasis of the on-line local character of spoken interaction.  Such things as the 
stabilizing influence of social institutions and activity practices have not been 
sufficiently dealt with. 
(v) Like speech act theory, conversational analysis suffers from a lack of 
consideration of variation due to culture and activity.  The turn taking organisation 
is supposed to be universal even though empirical investigations show that many 
of the basic features posited for instance by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974, 
in fact are constant neither from one activity to another, nor from one culture to 
another. 
Again, the difficulties I have mentioned have lead me to suggest a somewhat different 
approach. Instead of the turn as a basic organizational unit of talk, I am suggesting that 
the utterance (or more generally the contribution) should have this role and be seen as 
the carrier of various types of properties, like communicative functions and grammatical 
units (see section 6). Rather than only indulging in implicit use of background 
information and interpretation, I think the explicit analysis of implicit information is one 
of the main tasks of a theory of communicative interaction and should be pursued 
through a theory of context and an account of how meaningful features of utterances are 
constituted as context related aspects of those utterances. Such a theory of context 
should take as its point of departure the multilevel organization of spoken interaction 
and include an account of both the general, global (and thus predictable and expectable) 
features and the specific, local (less predictable) features.  It should also attempt to 
explain rather than merely observe such phenomena as adjacency pairs and preference 
organization (see section 7.3). 
2.4  Grice 
Another important contribution to our understanding of communication and the 
pragmatic aspects of language used has been made by Paul Grice (e.g. Grice 1975).  In a 
way reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s analysis of the preconditions of understanding, cf. 
Kant 1975, Grice presented an analysis of communication in terms of maxims of 
rational communication.  Grice claimed that rational communication is basically 
governed by a superordinate principle "be cooperative" which is further specified by 
four maxims, which Grice gave the same names that Kant used for his fourfold division 
of the categories (quality, relation, quantity and manner).  One might surmise that he, 
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through this choice of names, wished to suggest a connection between categories of 
understanding and categories of communication. Formulating a methodological slogan 
"Don't confuse the  meaning with the use", he proposed that the Wittgensteinian idea of 
"meaning as use" had led to confusion and should be replaced by a distinction between 
"literal meaning" and "implicated meaning".  He then used the maxims to try to 
demonstrate how his distinction could be upheld by deriving implicated meaning from 
literal meaning. 
Grice also contributed an analysis of meaning based on intention, i.e., "non-natural 
meaning" (Grice 1957 and Grice 1969), a notion which he claimed should be basic for 
linguistic meaning.  Grice's work is, thus, an important attempt to integrate the analysis 
of meaning and language into a more general theory of human rationality and action. 
Below, I will first discuss Grice’s work on conversational maxims and then briefly 
turn to his analysis of non-natural meaning. 
(i) Grice’s purpose is to analyze conversation as a species of rational behavior.  But 
is it irrational to be uncooperative?  It seems that lying or giving misleading 
information can be very rational, on occasion.  Whether being uncooperative is 
rational or not depends on what you want to achieve, i.e., on  your goals, and 
whether it is acceptable or not depends on your principles of ethics.  Grice's 
analysis of rationality in relation to communication seems, thus, on the one hand 
to be partly instrumentalistic and, on the other hand to subsume parts of ethics and 
esthetics (esp. the maxims of manner).  A different and I believe more perspicuous 
analysis would be to assume a fully instrumental concept of rationality in 
combination with an introduction of ethical principles.  In such an analysis, 
rationality can only be predicated of means in relation to some goal.  If goals are 
said to be rational, that always implies that they are seen as means to some more 
abstract goal.  No ultimate goals are rational. Rather they are arational. Analyzed 
this way, rationality, therefore, needs to be supplemented by ethical principles 
which can provide goals which support cooperation, etc. (see section 4). 
(ii) A consequence of the unclarity of the notion of rationality in Grice's analysis is 
that his taxonomy of maxims can be criticized. The maxims seem to overlap.  Is 
one relevant (maxim of relation) if one gives too much or too little information 
(maxim of quantity)? Is not being brief (maxim of manner) and not giving too 
much information (maxim of quantity) almost the same thing?  Is not giving too 
little information (maxim of quantity) a form of lying (maxim of quality) etc? 
It is also clear that the maxims are not exhaustive (this is admitted by Grice 
himself).  One can mislead in more ways than the one's Grice has mentioned. If 
ethical principles are to be included, why are not other aspects of ethics such as 
"not hurting other people", "not forcing other people" etc., included? 
(iii) Let me now turn to non-natural meaning. In Grice 1957 and in subsequent articles, 
Grice 1969, it is claimed that what distinguishes "natural meaning" from "non-
natural meaning" is that "a non-natural meaning X" has to arise by virtue of some 
agent A’s intention that some agent B should comprehend X by recognizing A's 
intention to mean X, while in the case of "natural meaning", no such mediation of 
meaning via intended recognition of some agent's intention is necessary. In so far 
as Grice's account of "non-natural meaning" also can be seen as an account of 
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communication, the account I want to suggest differs from Grice's in neither 
making recognition of intention nor intention that such a recognition should take 
place (and, thus, not what Grice calls "non-natural meaning") a necessary 
requirement on communication. Natural meaning in Grice's and everybody else's 
sense can be communicated and comprehended both in the sense of "(causally) 
explained" and in the sense of "understanding purpose" (see below section 4).  
Natural meaning can be communicated if it is connected with appropriate 
communicative intentions (display or signal, cf. Allwood, 1976) and can 
subsequently be apprehended, explained or understood by a receiver. As far as I 
can see, Grice’s criterion for non-natural meaning, if extended to communication, 
will only be met in the case where the sender has an intention that the receiver 
should recognize meaning M by virtue of recognizing "his intention to 
communicate meaning M", which in very many cases is not required in normal 
communication, where it is sufficient that meaning M is simply communicated. 
The account I want to suggest also differs from Grice's in having a more detailed 
breakdown of the various features of communicative intentionality. In this paper, 
this mainly concerns what I have referred to as the "expressive" and "evocative" 
functions of a communicative act. For further analysis of communicative 
intentionality cf. Allwood 1976 and 1978.  For a deeper and more thorough and 
also comparative analysis of Grice’s work on "non-natural meaning" see Nivre 
1992. 
2.5  Dialog Grammars 
A fifth approach that should be mentioned is that of Dialog Grammars, e.g. Sinclair and 
Coulthard 1975 and independently, in slightly different form by Moeschler 1989 and 
Scha and Polanyi 1988. Dialog grammar  have been instrumental in bringing pragmatics 
to the attention of researchers doing classroom analysis Faerch and Kasper 1984 and to 
parts of the AI community Wachtel 1986.  In this approach, rules are formulated which 
attempt to state sequential dependencies between speech acts such as question - answer. 
Some of the problems with this approach have already been alluded to above. 
(i) How do we extend the analysis from question-answer to other such sequences?  
How common are such sequences? 
(ii) How firm is the connection between the members of the sequence?  Can a dialog 
grammar generate or accept sequences such as:   
A: what time is it 
B: shut up 
(iii) Can the rules of a dialog grammar be modified to allow for context dependence 
and multifunctionality in dialog acts? 
(iv) Can a theoretical account be given for why there should exist sequences of speech 
acts at all? This would entail that over and above rules for the sequences, a theory 
of communicative interaction motivating the rules should be formulated. 
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2.6  Clark 
The present account also differs from the account given in Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs 
(1986) and Clark and Schaefer (1989). In these papers, a notion of collaborative speech 
acts is put forward and it is suggested that the appropriate metaphor for dialog is the 
musical concert, where the musicians together produce a coherent output.  One main 
difference between the present account and the account in Clark and Schaefer can be 
brought out by the following examples: 
(7) I warned him but he did not hear me. 
(8) I was referring to Bertrand Russell but she did not hear me. 
(9) I warned him unintentionally 
(10) I referred unintentionally to Bertrand Russell 
According to Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark and Schaefer, neither (7) nor (8) 
describe possible state of affairs. According to them, it is not possible to perform a 
communicative act (speech act), without an appropriate reaction taking place in a 
receiver, in this case, amounting to an appropriate response of recognition of the speech 
act. If it were possible, this would mean that communicative acts could occur without 
being collaborative which they claim is not possible.  Similarly, although less clearly 
stated, it seems that neither 9 nor 10 would be possible, since actions should be 
intentional.   
I believe that, in fact, our ordinary pretheoretical somewhat indeterminate concept 
of action allows for all four cases. In so far as this pretheoretical conception surfaces in 
the meanings of verbs for communicative acts in the natural languages I am acquainted 
with, this conception allows for an indeterminacy or underspecificity with regard to the 
identity criteria which ideally can be associated with an action (cf, Allwood 1978). 
Briefly, these say that an action ideally is constituted by a relation between a specific 
type of intention, a specific type of behavior, a specific result and a specific context. 
However, in ordinary talk about action, it seems that the intention, behavioral form or 
actual result ( and in some cases context) of some instance of behavior can all, taken one 
by one, depending on circumstances, be used to identify the behavior as a particular type 
of action. 
This means that, at least as far as the conception of action which surfaces in 
ordinary language is concerned, communicative acts need neither necessarily be 
resultative nor intentional and the fact that they need not be resultative, in turn, means 
that they need not be collaborative. An individual communicator can make a 
contribution (perform a communicative act) without being perceived or understood. He 
or she can even make a contribution unintentionally.  Above all, even when a 
contribution is intentional and understood, it need not be responded to overtly in order 
to count as a communicative act leading to communication. Imagine only the following 
case which involves interactive, collaborative communication without overt response. 
(ii) A: Think of a number 
 B: (no response but hears, understands and thinks of a number) 
 A: Double it and then multiply it by three 
 B: (no response but hears, understands and mentally carries out the 
operations) 
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Contributions in the form of "acknowledging feedback", cf. Allwood (1976), are not 
needed to constitute speech acts but rather to inform the interlocutor of the extent to 
which his communicative objectives are met and sometimes, like when we listen to the 
radio or watch TV, we communicate without any feedback at all. 
Successful communicative interaction is therefore not due to a (single) 
communicative act's necessarily being collective and collaborative. Rather it is due to 
the fact that cooperation and interactive communication to be successful, require that 
individuals employ individual context dependent communicative acts of sending and 
receiving (understanding) in such a way  that a kind of collaboration results. 
2.7  Relevance Theories 
Several researchers have proposed that the concept of relevance is important for an 
understanding of human communication.  Perhaps the first suggestion in this direction 
was made by the social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1970), who claimed 
that relevance is a principle according to which an individual organizes his/her cognitive 
structures into "provinces of meaning".  Concerns based on relevance, then, through 
interpretation and cognition, guide human action and communication.  Another 
suggestion was made by the logician Noel Belnap (Belnap 1969) who proposed a logic 
of relevance to handle inferences that were relevant but not quite valid.  A third 
suggestion was made by Wilson and Sperber 1984 and Sperber and Wilson 1986,  who 
claimed that the Gricean maxims of rational communication, in fact, could be reduced 
to one of them - relation - which by Grice is paraphrased as "be relevant".  Relevance is 
then by them analyzed as "maximal information with minimal processing effort". A 
fourth proposal was made in Allwood 1984 and slightly differently in Allwood 1992.   
All four approaches have slightly different objectives.  They are for this reason not 
strictly comparable. However, I will make a few comments in order to place what will 
be said below (section 7) in perspective. 
The phenomenological approach, exemplified by Schutz 1970, connects relevance 
with phenomenological intentionality, cognition and the meaningful structuring of 
consciousness.  I think this is basically the right way to go and my own approach can be 
seen as a development of this.  
Belnap’s suggestion has the difficulty that so far no other system of valid inference 
than deductive logic (with more or less constructivist restrictions) has been developed.  
All other systems including Belnap’s own seem to be parasitical on (and presuppose) 
this system.  What do we do with the case of a relevant but false conclusion? Do we 
really want to consider false conclusions relevant?  Could the following, for example, be 
accepted as an  inference:  "All men want to be beautiful.  Socrates is a man.  Therefore, 
Socrates is beautiful". While the conclusion could be claimed to relevant it does not 
seem to be an acceptable inference. It could be made acceptable by introducing hidden 
premises or default assumptions such as: "All men who want to be beautiful are 
beautiful". But this would not amount to a new inference relation, it is deuctive logic 
with hidden premises. 
Sperber and Wilson want to do the same job as Grice using only one of his four 
maxims. The job, as they see it, might perhaps be paraphrased as the explanation of 
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"relevant interpretation of text or of utterances in dialog".  They do this by reducing 
relevance to "maximal information" with "minimal processing effort" which in turn is 
interpreted as "restricted maximal logical inference" with "minimal processing effort". 
The restrictions are necessary since any proposition logically entails an infinite amount 
of other propositions. 
It might now be asked if this is the best explication of relevance.  Can there not be 
maximally informative easily processable interpretions which do not seem relevant? 
Consider the case of metaphors. 
A: This is not my cup of tea 
B: I don't see any tea cup 
For reasons of minimal processing effort, the (literal) interpretation which underlies B’s 
response seems to be the most relevant interpretation in Sperber and Wilson's sense. A 
metaphorical interpretation would probably require more processing effort and could not 
so easily be generated as the most relevant one. It is, thus, questionable whether the 
notion of relevance as defined by Sperber and Wilson is the most intuitive one. 
In Allwood 1984 the notion of "relevance" is claimed to be a "relational" concept. 
This basically means that something is not "relevant" tout court but something x is 
relevant for something y with regard to some z in some activity A etc. Basic to the 
notion of "relevance" is, however, that it involves a meaningful connection, mostly, in 
fact, a means-ends relation. To see something as relevant is to see which purpose it 
serves.  This has an immediate application to communication, since it can be claimed (cf 
Allwood, 1984) that to understand somebody is to be able to see him/her as a motivated 
rational agent, which entails being able to see his/her actions (including communicative 
actions) as relevant to some purpose. To the extent that another person's actions are 
totally irrelevant, it is not possible to see him/her as a motivated rational agent and 
therefore also not possible to understand his/her behavior in this way (see further, 
below, section 7). 
In general, a notion of relevance should satisfy the following requirements: 
(i) Relevance should be relational - nothing is absolutely relevant - but relevant for 
someone/something in relation to something else and it should be clear what 
relations of relevance are analyzed in the theory. 
(ii) Multiple relevance should be possible.  It should, for example,  be possible to see 
how an utterance can be relevant in several ways. 
(iii) Degrees of relevance should be possible.  It should be possible to claim that one 
utterance is more or less relevant than another. 
(iv) The analysis of relevance should be related to a more general theoretical account 
of communication. 
In the following sections of this paper, I will try to give a sketch of an activity based 
approach to communication and pragmatics which has been developed partly  in 
response to some of the arguments and questions discussed above. 
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3.   An activity based approach to communication and pragmatics 
Building on the critical review given above, I therefore turn to a more direct and 
positive characterization of the activity based approach  to communication and 
pragmatics.  
3.1  Multilayered constraints and enablements 
The first thing to notice is perhaps the complexity of the relations that are established 
between the participants in an event of communication.  At least the following levels of 
organisation are involved in any human activity, where each level provides necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for the next main level and, thus, also necessary but not 
sufficient enablements (resources) and constraints on human communication whether it 
occurs in spoken or written form.   
(i) Physical: The communicators are physical entities and their communicative 
contributions are physical processes/entities (usually of an optical or acoustical 
nature). 
(ii) Biological:  The communicators are biological organisms whose communicative 
contributions from this perspective can be seen as biological activation and 
directed behavior. 
(iii) Psychological:  
(A) Perception, understanding and emotion: The communicators are 
perceiving, understanding and emotional beings whose communicative 
contributions are perceptually comprehensible and emotionally charged 
phenomena. 
 (B) Motivation, rationality and agency: The communicators are motivated 
(including ethical, cooperative motives), rational agents whose communicative 
contributions, consequently, are motivated, rational acts (compare Grice (1975), 
Allwood (1976) and section 4). 
(iv) Social:  
A: Culture, social institution. The communicators are, at least provisionally, 
members of a culture and of one or more social institutions and their 
communicative contributions can, therefore, be characterized as cultural and social 
institutional acts. 
B: Language. They are also members of one or more linguistic communities and 
their contributions are normally linguistic acts. 
C: Activity. They, normally, play a role in a social activity and their 
communicative contributions are contributions to that activity through their role, 
e.g., as a sales clerk telling a customer about the price of some goods or a teacher 
lecturing to students (see section 5). 
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D: Communication.  They, normally, at a given point in time, focus more on 
either sending or receiving information, i.e., they are primarily either in the sender, 
(speaker, writer, etc.) role or in the receiver (listener, reader, etc.) role.  In the 
sending role, they are mostly performing a particular communicative act which 
makes them the agent of actions such as stating, asking, requesting, etc.  This leads 
to characterizations of their communicative contributions by such labels as sent 
message, speech, writing, statement, question and request. In the receiving role, 
they are instead agents of actions such as perceiving, understanding, evaluating 
and responding which are complementary to the actions performed in the sending 
role (see section 7). 
Since communication, in this way, involves a network of finely interwoven enablements 
and constraints, the "glue" or "cohesion" at work in an activity and a dialogue must be 
construed in a similar multilayered way.  One of the consequences of this is that 
communication and the successive contributions to an activity mostly are characterized 
by such features as redundancy, predictability, recoverability and, given the constraints 
on human perception and attention, a certain indeterminacy with regard to the actual 
current relevance of its various dimensions. 
In order, however, to analyze the redundancy in the "glue", the layers have to be 
described both individually and in relation to each other. It is to this task that I now turn, 
in trying to describe some aspects of the levels described above.  I will start by first 
describing some consequences of motivation, rationality and agency and then turn to 
how activity influences communication and end by discussing the nature of basic units 
and functions of communication and how sequences of these can create dialog cohesion  
 
4.   Motivation, rationality, agency, explanation and 
 understanding 
One of the levels of organization which is relevant for the study of communication 
allows us to see communicators as rational agents pursuing various motives and goals, 
some of which are cooperative and ethical. In fact,  communication in many ways seems 
to build on the human ability for rational coordinated (cooperative) interaction. 
Let us now take a look at this ability. As we have seen above, one of the first 
attempts to give an analysis of this was the one presented in Grice 1975. However, it 
was also argued that this attempt has some difficulties. 
In Allwood 1976 and 1978, I made some suggestions in which I tried to build on 
Grice’s insights while avoiding some of the difficulties mentioned above.  The analysis 
presents six principles of communication seen as a species of rational motivated action 
and interaction. 
(A) Agency (i) 
(ii) 
Intentionality 
Volition 
(B) Motivation (i) 
(ii) 
General 
Pleasure/ pain 
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(C) Rationality (i) 
(ii) 
Adequacy 
Competence 
The two first principles postulate that action is analyzed as behavior involving intention 
and volition. The next two principles postulate that  motivation underlies action and 
often involves the wish to seek pleasure and escape pain. Other kinds of motivation 
involve, for instance,  cooperation, ethics, power and esthetics. The last two principles 
say that rationality is analyzed in terms of adequate (efficient) and competent (making 
sure of preconditions) action. The notions of agency, motivation and rationality are then 
used to give an analysis of ethics and cooperation as relevant for communication. Ethics 
is analyzed as involving the "golden rule" or in Kantian terms "universalizability" with 
regard to agency, motivation and rationality. "Doing unto others what you would have 
them do unto you" is claimed to entail "making it possible for others to be rational, 
motivated agents". If you consider other persons in this way, you take them into "ethical 
consideration". Communicative interaction is claimed to always involve some degree of 
cooperation which is defined as follows: Two agents cooperate to the extent that they 
(i) take each other into cognitive consideration 
(ii) have a joint purpose 
(iii) take each other into ethical consideration 
(iv) trust each other with regard to (i) - (iii) 
Communication involves at least cognitive consideration, i.e., an attempt to perceive 
and understand another person's actions (where these can be both non-communicative 
and communicative in nature).  If communication is intentional, it is further claimed to 
involve at least one joint purpose, i.e., the purpose of sharing information, or perhaps 
better, sharing understanding which incidentally also is what the etymology of 
communication (communicare: to make common or shared) indicates. 
Communication is always cooperative in the first sense and mostly also in the 
second sense, even if it involves conflict.  You cannot deal your opponent a blow, and 
stay safe, unless you cognitively consider him/her and for many kinds of conflictual 
action, you also want your opponent to understand what you are doing or saying which 
also requires at least cognitive consideration of his possibilities of doing so. 
Communication is, however, very often cooperative in much more than the 
minimal sense just described.  Usually, it involves ethical consideration, we don't lie to 
other people (more than marginally), we don't usually hurt them, we don't usually 
impose on them (in fact, politeness norms, which are widely adhered to, often have the 
purpose of preventing pain and imposition).  It also involves trust.  Normally, we don't 
think others are lying, trying to hurt us or impose on us. 
We have already noted above that an important part of being able to understand 
another person is to be able to interpret the purpose or the motives behind his 
communicative and non-communicative actions.  If we cannot find any such purpose or 
motive, we cannot "understand" him/her as a rational motivated agent but have instead 
to try to comprehend his/her actions in another way, for example, by "explaining" them 
causally.  In fact, conceptually speaking, both "understanding"(in the narrow sense used 
here) and "explanaining" can be seen as special cases of "comprehending"or 
"understanding in a wider sense" which can be defined as "establishing a meaningful 
connection between input information and stored background information". It could also 
be claimed that "understanding in a narrow sense", i.e., understanding of intentions and 
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motives, can be seen as a special case of "explaining", in view of the causal role of 
motives and intentions.  
In everyday life and conversation, we constantly switch between an 
"understanding"(in the narrow sense) and an "explanatory" mode of comprehension.  If 
another person coughs, this can be because he/she wants us to notice something fishy 
(purpose) or because something obstructed his/her breathing (cause).  Likewise, if the 
normally shy A says "I love you" to B, after he/she has had a few drinks, our 
comprehension of A's utterance would combine understanding (he/she was motivated by 
love) with explanation (the drinks had caused him/her to be less bound by social 
restrictions). 
Thus, in the analysis suggested here, rationality, motivation and agency are 
essential ingredients of both the production and understanding of human 
communication, but they are not the only ingredients.  Other aspects of the physical, 
biological, psychological and social resources and constraints are also necessary and are 
drawn upon continuously to supplement interpretation and comprehension when 
"understanding" in terms of rational motivated action is insufficient. Perhaps, we as 
communicators usually want to be "understood" rather than merely "explained" and 
therefore primarily try to understand others by trying to see them as relevant (motivated 
rational agents). However, we often combine this with comprehending them by 
"explanation". 
Philosophically speaking, this means that, in relation to the views put forth, for 
example, in Dilthey 1883 and von Wright 1971, I do not believe that "explanation" and 
"understanding" should be pursued separately in something like 
"Geisteswissenschaffen" and "Naturwissenschaffen" but rather that they should be 
regarded as possibly analytically distinguishable modes of comprehension, for which it 
is a challenge to find new forms of integration. 
 
5. The Role of Activity 
One of Wittgenstein’s basic claims was that the meaning of linguistic expressions 
should be analyzed as their use in different language games. 
In activity-based communication analysis (or communicative activity analysis), 
this claim is further analyzed in the following way: 
The choice and meaning of linguistic expressions is seen as a product of the 
interaction between an inherent "meaning potential" of the expression and the use it is 
put to in linguistic constructions, communicative functions and joint social activities.  
The use is, thus, defined in terms of (i) collocations in different types of grammatical 
structure, (ii) participation in different types of communicative functions (see section 
7.3) and (iii) occurrence in a specific type of social activity. 
Let us now briefly consider the notion of a social activity.  A social activity can be 
characterized by the following parameters (cf. Allwood 1980 and 1984): 
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1. Type, purpose, function: procedures 
2. Roles: competence/obligations/rights 
3. Instruments: machines/media 
4. Other physical environment 
The type, purpose or function of an activity gives it its rationale, i.e., the reason for its 
existence.  So by finding out the purpose, we get at least a vague idea about what means 
could be used to pursue the activity.  I have used two words "purpose" and "function" to 
indicate that an activity might be pursued for many reasons, some of which are less 
commonly acknowledged - these latter one might then call functions.  The purpose and 
function have often given rise to procedures which help define what the activity is all 
about. An activity is also reinforced by the fact that there is a term for it. When we 
understand terms like "discussion", "negotiation", "lecture" etc., what we understand is 
mostly precisely the function or purpose of a specific type of activity 
One of the means whereby an activity gets pursued, again and again, is by being 
associated with certain standard activity roles, i.e., standard tasks in the activity which 
usually are performed by one person.  The role can, on the grounds of this association, 
be analyzed into competence requirements, obligations and rights, where the 
competence requirement can be seen as a precondition of the obligations.  As an 
example, consider lecturing as an activity.  The purpose is something like oral transfer 
of information in a coherent fashion to a larger number of people.  Stereotypically, the 
activity gives rise to two roles that of the lecturer and that of a member of the audience.  
The lecturer is obliged to talk coherently on an agreed topic (in which he/she is 
supposed to be competent) and the audience should listen, at least they should seem like 
they are listening and perhaps critically evaluate and ask questions. 
Instruments and machines also play an important role for many activities and will, 
if they are used, create their own patterns of communication. For some they are 
necessary.  For others they are more ancillary. Consider, for example, the influence of 
blackboard, chalk and overhead projectors on lecturing.  
Other physical circumstances can also be relevant like level of sound or lighting.  
If the acoustics are bad, the lecturer will have to raise his voice;  if the light is too bright, 
no overhead-projector can be used, etc. 
For most human activities, communication plays an important instrumental role.  
The nature of this role can vary from being necessary, like in a lecture or a negotiation, 
to being helpful but perhaps not always necessary.  At least, the need for communication 
might diminish after the basic pattern of the activity has been established, like in garden 
work or fishing.  An activity can, however, be predominantly communicative, like 
talking in order to relax, even if talking strictly speaking is not necessary for relaxing.  
In the same way, communication is sometimes necessary like in housing construction, 
even if housing construction cannot be said to be a predominantly communicative 
activity. 
For both activities and communication, a certain degree of cooperation is essential.  
In Allwood 1976, it was suggested that cooperation can be analyzed by four conditions 
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(see above section 4), each of which is sufficient to speak of some degree of 
cooperation, but which together make up what could be called ideal cooperation. 
Communication in itself always involves some degree of cooperation but the 
degree of cooperation is strengthened by participation in a joint activity.  Consider again 
lecturing. If lecturing is to be successful, the lecturer and the audience must cognitively 
consider each other, they must also actively work toward the purpose of the activity, 
which will imply structuring and meaningful content, on the part of the lecturer, and 
active listening, critical evaluation and maybe note-taking, on the part of the audience.  
Ethical consideration also plays a role, the lecturer should not waste the time of the 
audience, not insult them, not make slanderous remarks about other persons, etc., and 
the audience should not disturb the lecture but generally show courteous behavior.  
Trust can also play a role, the lecturer trusts the audience to pay attention and the 
audience trusts the lecturer to be well prepared and to give them correct information, on 
a level which they are capable of handling. 
It is obvious from the analysis just given that the ethical and functional aspects of 
an activity can strengthen each other.  To do what is ethically right in relation to 
lecturing (or any given activity) is mostly also to do what is functionally desirable or, at 
least, not dysfunctional. 
The strength of the obligations which are generated on ethical, functional and 
perhaps other grounds, will vary according to circumstances. For example,  if there are 
no text books, or if the lectures cover material not occurring in the text books, but 
occurring in tests, the functional necessity for note taking increases. 
The requirements on the activity rules, thus, include requirements on 
communication.  The different communication roles can be connected with specific 
ethically and functionally motivated obligations and tasks.  For example, in teaching, we 
expect the teacher to be sincere, to motivate his claims by giving evidence and to take 
the previous knowledge and general state of fatigue of his/her audience into account.  
We also expect the teacher to check whether his students have understood and learned, 
which is one of the things that might distinguish a teacher from a lecturer.  Another 
perhaps weaker expectation is that a teacher should encourage students to ask questions 
to further their knowledge and to check their understanding.  This means that some of 
the communicative acts which are typical of a teacher are "stating" to describe and 
explain, "asking questions" to check and control and "making requests" to instruct and 
control. If we turn instead to the students;  they are supposed to listen, try to understand 
and to some extent evaluate, learn and integrate with previous knowledge.  This means 
that students typically will "be quiet", "listen" and "try to understand and learn".  When 
they are in the sender role, they will "give feedback" to indicate perception and 
understanding.  They will "answer questions" and on a rare occasion "ask the teacher a 
question" or "make an objection". 
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6. Basic Units of Communication 
Let us now take a look at the process of communication itself and the basic units which 
occur in it. 
The basic individual communicative unit in interaction, I will call a "contribution".  
A "contribution" can be defined as an instance of communicative behavior bounded by 
lack of activity or another communictor’s activity.  If the speaker's activity should cease 
during a contribution (e.g. by pausing while speaking), the pause must not be filled by 
another communicator's contribution, nor must it be so long that it is more reasonable to 
regard renewed activation as a new contribution.  The unit in spoken language 
corresponding to a contribution is an utterance. Each contribution can be characterized 
with regard to both expressive and content related features, cf. Hjelmslev 1943. 
A. Expression features: A contribution can, for example,  be expressed by gestures or 
oral linguistic means. The latter can be subdivided into such units as acoustic, 
articulatory and perceptual features, phonemes, syllables, morphemes, words and 
phrases such as NP, VP, PP and S.  A contribution can contain several units of different 
types, for example, several grammatical units. Cf. example (3) where, for ease of 
reference, the grammatical units are marked with punctuation marks and capitals. 
(3) A: Yes! Come tomorrow.  Go to the church!  Bill will be there, ok? 
 B: The church, ok 
Example  (3) shows that utterances are not coterminous with sentences.  A's utterance 
contains 2 feedback morphemes and 3 sentences, and B's utterance contains an NP and a 
feedback morpheme but no sentence. 
B.  Content features: From a content point of view, a contribution can also be 
classified in several different ways. Some examples are the follwing: (i) Degree of 
explicitness; is the content explicitly asserted or is it implied in some way? (ii) Types of 
entities and combinations of entities expressed through various grammatical devices for 
reference, predication and attribution , e.g. object, substance, property, relation, process, 
state, event and course of events, (iii)  Types of emotions or attitudes expressed through 
intonation and gestures but also through choice of vocabulary and type of grammatical 
construction, (iv) Types of communicative function. In general I will be assuming the 
following three types of functions:  
1. Own communication management (OCM) - to enable a communicator to choose 
and change his/her message (cf. Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén, 1990).  
2. Interactive communication management (ICM) - to enable communicators to 
manage the interaction, for example, with regard to sequences, feedback and turn 
management,( see section 7.4).  
3. Other communicative functions, such as those which constitute communicative 
acts like stating, requesting or questioning 
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A contribution can be mono - or multifunctional. If it is multifunctional, its 
multifunctionality can be simultaneous or sequential.  A's utterance in example (3) 
above, for example, contains sequentially the functions feedback giving (cf. Allwood, 
Nivre, Ahlsén, 1992), request, request, statement and response elicitation.  Furthermore, 
the statement `Bill will be there' could simultaneously be a promise and, thus, illustrates 
simultaneous multifunctionality.  Functional features such as request, statement, 
promise, could also be called "communicative acts".  This concept, in turn, has a 
historical connection to concepts like  "illocutionary force" Austin (1962) and "speech 
act", cf Searle (1969),  and was proposed in Allwood (1976) and Allwood (1978) in 
order to amend some of the problems with these notions, mentioned above. A 
communicative act can be defined as a contribution or feature/part of a contribution 
which can be connected with a communicative intention (purpose, goal or function) or a 
communicative result. The reason for the disjunction in the definition is that 
communicative acts, like actions in general, seem to be identifiable by either behavioral 
form, intention or result, cf. also above sections 2.2. and 2.6. 
In summary, thus, the contribution (utterance) is proposed as the basic unit of 
communicative interaction, in which it serves as an anchoring point for other kinds of 
organization, such as feedback, the right to communicate  (turn management), 
grammatical structuring, and functional intentional structuring (communicative acts). 
6.2  Sequences of contributions 
Contributions are not made in random order, but are in various ways dependent on each 
other. As we have already noted, this has led to proposals such as those of adjacency 
pairs and dialog grammars. In the framework proposed here, the order of contributions 
is ultimately dependent on all the types of resources and enablements mentioned above, 
in section 3. Below, I will now discuss some of these, namely those that are connected 
with the assumptions of (i) motivation, rationality and ethics, (ii) the mutual dependence 
of communication and social activity and (iii) various functions of communication. The 
point of departure for the investigation will be the functional features. 
 
7. Sequences of  contributions and dialogue cohesion 
7.1  Expressive and evocative dimensions of communication 
Let us now take a closer look at communicative functions and at how a more fine 
grained analysis of these functions can be used to give an account of cohesion, cf also 
Allwood (1976) and (1978).  Each communicative act, e.g. statement, question, request, 
exclamation, can be said, on the one hand, to count as an "expression" of an attitude 
(with a content) on the part of the speaker and, on the other hand, to count as an attempt 
to "evoke" a reaction from the listener.  Table 1 summarizes this analysis for the four 
mentioned communicative acts. In statements and exclamations, the expressive 
dimension is more in focus, while in questions and requests it is the evocative 
dimension which is in focus. 
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Table 1   Components of dialogue cohesion. Analysis of the expressive and evocative 
 dimensions of four communicative acts 
 
Type of communicative act Expressive Evocative 
Statement belief (that listener shares) belief 
judgement 
Question desire for information (that listener provides) the 
desired information 
Request desire for X (that listener provides) X 
Exclamation any attitude (that listener attends to 
attitude) 
To illustrate the role of the claims made in the table concerning cohesion, consider a 
speaker A making a statement like "It's raining" to a speaker B. According to the table, 
A, thus, expresses his belief that it is raining and wants, or at least has nothing against, 
the same belief being evoked in B. If he/she asks a question like "Is it raining?", he/she 
expresses a desire for information and wishes to evoke the desired information from 
his/her interlocutor. 
7.2  Obligations in communication 
The expressive and evocative features of a contribution are connected with obligations.  
A person who through his/her contribution is expressing or evoking something is 
normally obligated in the following ways (cf. Allwood 1994), which we can call 
"communicative sender obligations": 
(i) sincerity; He/she should have the attitude that is being expressed For 
instance, a statement of P implies belief in P etc. 
(ii) grounding;  He/she should have the motivation and competence required for 
the communicative act. For example, making a claim requires 
some form of evidence for the claim. 
(iii) consideration; He/she should consider whether the interlocutor can and wants 
to comply with the main evocative intentions of the utterance. 
For example, in making a claim he/she should consider whether 
the listener has enough background information or might be in 
possession of counter evidence to the claim. 
But also a receiver is obligated to certain actions by communication. After each 
utterance he/she must evaluate whether and how he/she can and/or wants to continue, 
perceive, understand and in other ways attitudinally react to the previous utterance(s) in 
question.  Besides being a necessary requirement for communication, this can also be 
normatively reconstrued as a number of communicative obligations based on a basic 
human social tendency to be contactable for coordination of information, which, in turn, 
is perhaps the most important precondition for social cohesion. What I have above 
referred to as "ethical consideration" is important here. To ignore another human being's 
wish to share information would make it impossible for him/her to be a rational 
motivated agent, in this respect. Ethical considerations reinforce the tendency to be 
contactable. Secondly, to accept the information without critical evaluation, which takes 
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into consideration, your own ability, knowledge and desires would be to neglect both 
your own rationality, motivation or agency and the needs of the other party. A third 
obligation, somewhat weaker than that already mentioned, is, then, the obligation to 
report on the result of the evaluation.  We could call the two first obligations, 
contactability and evaluation, "the obligations of consideration" (the receiver's 
consideration of the sender) and the third obligation "the obligation of responsiveness". 
Given the obligations of consideration and responsiveness, B must now evaluate 
whether and how he can (and/or wishes to) continue, perceive, understand and react to 
the main evocative intention of the previous utterance. Let us assume that he can (and 
wishes to) continue, perceive and understand. Some possible reactions are given in 
example (4). 
(4) A: It's raining 
 11: Yes (it is) 
 B2: Are you sure 
 B3: No (it isn't) 
In B1, B accepts the evocative intention.  In B2, he questions A's grounds for the 
expressed belief and, thus, also the grounds for the reasonableness of accepting it as his 
own. In B3, he denies the validity of the expressed belief and by implication, he also 
rejects the force of the evocative intention and his own ability (or wish) to accept the 
belief. 
Also B's various replies in example (5) below, honor the receiver's obligations, 
even though they are clear transgressions against other obligations. 
(5) A: How are you? 
 B1: Shut up, I don't want to listen to you 
 B2: I don't have time 
 B3: I don't understand 
 B4: None of your business 
Normally, in dialogue, contactability, evaluation and responsiveness are combined with 
other obligations (e.g. ethical, esthetical or power based) which would tend to prohibit 
B1-B4. Further examples of such obligations are given in the maxims formulated in 
Grice (1975) or Allwood (1976).  
In fact, the receiver's obligations can themselves, as we have seen, be considered 
as a special case of the application of these maxims. The receiver's obligations are 
frequently combined also with the obligations and conventions which are connected 
with a particular activity or a particular role in an activity. A pupil in a school class is 
under a different pressure to answer the teacher's questions in the classroom than he is to 
answer his friends' questions during the break. The pupil role, thus, reinforces his 
"responsiveness obligation" in relation to the teacher. 
7.3  Evaluation and report 
All three utterances B1-B3, in (4), respect the obligation of communicative 
responsiveness. Explicitly they report on an evaluation of the main evocative function in 
A's utterance and implicitly they positively report on the functions of contact, perception 
and understanding. 
 22 
Thus, an evaluation of all these four basic feedback functions of communication 
can be reported on positively or negatively, explicitly or implicitly. Table 2 gives us a 
survey of the possibilities seen as possible replies from a speaker B to a speaker A who 
has uttered "It's raining". "No reply", "any reply" and "irrelevant reply" are meant as 
descriptions of types of replies rather than as instances of replies. 
Table 2  Positive, negative, implicit, explicit reports on evaluation of a preceding    
     utterance "It's raining" 
 
Basic 
communicative 
functions 
Positive Negative 
 explicit implicit explicit implicit 
contact "I will continue" any reply which 
pays attention to 
interlocutor 
"I have to go" no reply  
walk away 
perception "I can hear you" any reply which 
betrays that the 
interlocutor's 
contribution has 
been perceived 
"What", "pardon", 
"sorry","I can't 
hear you". 
irrelevant reply 
understanding "I understand" any reply which 
betrays that the 
interlocutor’s 
contribution has 
been understood 
"What", "pardon", 
"sorry", "I don't 
understand" 
irrelevant reply 
reaction to main 
evocative 
intention 
"Yes it is" "But yesterday it 
was sunny" 
"No it isn't" "The sound on the 
window pane is 
the water from the 
neighbor’s garden 
hose" 
The implicit way of reporting positively on contact, perception and understanding is to 
let what one says presuppose (imply) that one is continuing and has perceived and 
understood.  Normally any relevant reply, whether it is positive or negative, would have 
this presupposition.  Thus, both the positive replies "yes it is" and the negative "no it 
isn't, it's sunny" normally imply that the speaker is continuing and has heard and 
understood the previous utterance.  The difference between the explicit "yes it is" and 
the implicit "but yesterday it was sunny" is that "yes it is" explicitly accepts the previous 
utterance as true while "but yesterday it was sunny" merely implies this. In general, the 
information that is implied is diminished by making any of the four basic feedback 
functions explicit. We, in fact, get a default chain of implications of the following sort, 
reaction to evocative intention —> understanding —> perception —> contact. So, if B 
says "I hear you" this implies contact but not necessarily understanding or any further 
attitudinal reaction.  It is also important to note that the implications are default 
implications since it might be possible, in some cases, to hear without continuing, or to 
understand without hearing properly, or to accept (as an example of an attitudinal 
reaction) without understanding. Even the implication of contact might be cancelled if 
we imagine a case where B by chance utters something to A which by C (to whom the 
utterance is not directed) is experienced as a relevant reply. 
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Let us now consider replies to the statement "it's raining" which combine different 
types of reports. Below in examples B5-B8, the text in brackets indicates the status of 
the reply with regard to explicitness (explicit and implicit), polarity (positive and 
negative) and basic feedback function (contact, perception, understanding and 
acceptance (an example of a reaction to the evocative function)). 
B4: I can hear you and I now understand that you are telling me about the 
weather (expl: pos: perc + expl: pos: underst.). 
B5: I understand you want your raincoat (expl: pos: underst. + impl: pos:  
underst.). 
B6: I understand what you say but you are wrong it isn't (expl: pos: underst. + 
expl: neg:  accept.) 
B7: I understand but the sound on the window pane is the water from the 
neighbor’s garden hose (expl: pos: underst. + impl: neg: accept). 
Examples B4-B7 show how implicit, explicit, positive and negative features can be 
combined with regard to the different basic communicative functions. 
7.4  Interactive communication management 
Evaluation and report form an important part of the mechanisms behind interactive 
communication management, with at least the following subfunctions: (i) sequencing, 
(ii) turn management, and (iii) feedback, cf. Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén (1992).  
1. Sequencing: Sequencing concerns the mechanisms, whereby a dialog is structured 
into sequences, subactivities, topics, etc. Sequencing to a large extent is an effect 
of limitations on simultaneous information processing in human beings and the 
means - ends character of many human activities. Everything cannot be done at the 
same time and some things form preconditions for others. We, therefore have a 
need for devices to show when one subactivity or topic ends and another one 
begins.  
2. Turn management: Turn management concerns mechanisms which 
communicators use for the distribution of the right to occupy the sender role in 
communication (having the turn). Since turns are defined as a right to 
communicate it is a normative rather than a behavioral unit but turns are often but 
not always, coterminous with utterances.  Consider the following examples:  
(6) A:  [It's raining?] 
 B: [m] 
(7)  A:  Don't go there 
 B:  (Silence) 
In (6) B utters "m" during A's turn ([ ] indicates overlap) and in (7) B has a turn 
but chooses to fill it with non-activity (silence). Example 1, thus, shows that an 
utterance does not have to be a turn and example 7 shows that a turn does not need 
to be an utterance. 
1. Feedback: Feedback concerns means which communicators continuously use to 
elicit and give information to each other, throughout a dialog, about the four basic 
communicative functions (contact, perception, understanding and reactions to the 
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main evocative intention of the preceding utterance) described above. The 
feedback system provides a kind of mini-version of the report system described 
above. With morphemes like yes, no, ok and oh, or mechanisms like repetition and 
pronominal reformulation, all of which are subject to prosodic modification, a 
speaker unobtrusively can combine information about the basic communicative 
functions with other information. For more details, cf. Allwood, Nivre and Ahlsén 
(1992). In fact, feedback morphemes and mechanisms, whether they occur as 
single utterances or as part of a larger utterance (often in initial position)  are 
probably the most important cohesion device in spoken language. 
 
8.  Dimensions of relevance 
Let me now finally return to the topic of section 2.7 above - relevance.  At the end of the 
section it was suggested that any relevance theory should meet four criteria:  (i) retain 
the relational nature of relevance, (ii) admit of multiple relevance, (ii) admit of degrees 
of relevance and (iv) derive relevance from a superordinate theory of communication. 
I would now like to show that the approach to relevance advocated in Allwood 
1984 and 1992 meets these criteria.  In this approach, relevance is basically analyzed as 
"meaningful relation" and it is further claimed that the most important such relation is 
the "means-ends" relation. Since the starting point of the analysis is that relevance is 
relational, it meets criterion (i), i.e., that of retaining the relational nature of relevance.  
It also meets criterion (ii) since an aspect of the analysis is to point out that we often 
pursue several goals at the same time, and that our actions therefore can be means to 
several ends, i.e., multiply relevant.  Since some means are better than others for 
achieving a particular end, the proposed analysis also admits of degrees of relevance - 
criterion (iii).  Finally, the account of relevance is a consequence of the analysis of 
communication as rational motivated action and interaction, which means that to 
produce a relevant utterance or a relevant interpretation is simply to act as a rational 
motivated communicator where producing a relevant interpretation is often guided by an 
attempt to interpret another agent's communicative behavior as rational motivated 
action. If this is possible, we understand another person, if it is not possible, we must 
still produce a relevant interpretation by explanation. 
Even though participants in a dialogue can be presumed to attempt to achieve 
relevance both in their own contributions and in interpreting the contributions of others, 
contributions can, all the same, be more or less relevant. Let us therefore take a look at 
some of the considerations which can lie behind attributions of degrees of relevance. 
Intuitively what is at stake with regard to degrees of relevance, is "importance for the 
purpose of communication". 
(i) Primary relevance. Here we find explicit or implicit reports of positive or 
negative evaluations of the most salient evocative intention(s) of the preceding 
contribution(s), as well as attempts, in the relevant cases, to carry out the tasks 
implied by the evocative intention. 
(ii) Secondary relevance. Secondarily relevant contributions concern lack of contact, 
perception and understanding. Such contributions are always relevant and have 
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precedence over others, since they concern preconditions for being able to evaluate 
the main evocative purpose of the preceding communicative contribution. In a 
sense, what we have here is an analog of the rule in formal meetings that "points 
of order" always have precedence. These contributions have precedence, but since 
they concern preconditions of communication rather than its main function, I have 
considered them secondarily relevant. 
(iii) Tertiary relevance. Tertiary relevance could perhaps be accorded to positive or 
negative contributions concerning overall purposes of the activity of which the 
dialogue is a part. Cf. C's contribution in example (6) below. 
(6) A1:  Coward 
 B:  Liar 
 C:  Please remember the purpose of this meeting. 
 A2: Not only is he a coward, now he spilled coffee on me 
Also contributions concerning various preconditions of a preceding contribution 
belong here. B's contribution in example (6) is an example of this. Both "coward" 
and "liar" are statements, even though in elliptical form, and thus presuppose 
sincerity and grounding on the part of the speakers. B's contribution, therefore, 
becomes relevant as a statement to the effect that this presupposed condition is not 
met by A, i.e. A does not really believe that B is a coward. 
(i) Quaternary relevance; Possibly a fourth degree of relevance could be accorded 
to contributions concerning other contextually available aspects. For example, 
such aspects as are available through perception in the speech situation or through 
cognitive activation caused by preceding discourse. A's second contribution in 
example 6 above exemplifies both of these features. 
In principle, I believe that these four types of relevance capture important aspects of 
what it means to be more or less relevant to the ongoing purpose of dialogue 
communication. By implication I would also claim that  this analysis captures  another 
aspect of what it means for a dialog to be (more or less) cohesive. 
9.  Conclusion 
It has been my purpose, in this paper, to give an account of some of the features of an 
activity based approach to communication and pragmatics. My account has focussed on 
what I above have called the psychological and social levels, i.e., properties of 
communication which can be related to the fact that communicators are perceiving, 
understanding and emotional beings who also can be seen as rational motivated agents 
occupying various activity roles. I have further tried to claim that mutual communicative 
attunement to some extent is enabled and constrained by maxims of rational, motivated 
action and what I have called the "obligation of responsiveness". 
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